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Abstract
A salient feature of the ’training market’ through which public training pro-
grammes are often organised is the external inspection of training providers. The
inspection of providers of Apprenticeship training in England has been shown to
focus more on procedural than on substantive attributes. From a statistical and
qualitative analysis of the content of inspection reports on training providers, we
infer that this proceduralist bias distorts information on training quality by type
of provider. Training sponsored by employers is made to appear less effective
relative to that offered by specialist training organisations. The informational
distortion is largely limited to private sector employers: other employer cate-
gories perform similarly to specialist training providers.
Keywords: training, apprenticeship, employers, inspection
1. Introduction
This paper addresses two issues. The first is the low participation of employers in
apprenticeship training in England. In other European countries, and historically
also in the UK, apprenticeship has normally involved sponsorship by an employer.
In the contemporary English ’training market’, however, not only is employer spon-
sorship not required, it is normally not present. Apprenticeship-type training is or-
ganised largely through the Apprenticeships programme. Most of the sponsors of
Apprenticeships are specialist training organisations, not employers. The low com-
mitment of employers to the Apprenticeships programme has been noted, and at
times lamented (DfES, 2001; Ryan, Gospel and Lewis, 2007).
The second issue is the contribution of external inspection to the quality of train-
ing. That the quality of much of the training funded by the Apprenticeships pro-
gramme is low has long been recognised by both public bodies and academics (LSC,
2004; Ryan and Unwin, 2001). The government has sought to bolster the inspection
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of training, and thereby to increase the quality-related information available to buy-
ers in the training market. The informational contribution of inspection has however
been shown to be weak, in that it addresses primarily procedural aspects of training
provision, such as management systems and records, and only secondarily substan-
tive ones, including the achievements of trainees (Lewis and Ryan, 2009).
These apparently distinct issues may interact, for two reasons. First, the quality
of training may differ systematically by type of provider. In particular, employer-
sponsored training may be of either higher or lower quality than that sponsored by
other bodies, given differences in incentives and resources. Second, the attributes
of training that inspection neglects, notably the substantive ones, appear to involve
bigger differences in quality between employers and other providers than those on
which it focuses, notably the procedural ones. If so, judgements concerning the
relative quality of employer-sponsored training will be distorted by external inspec-
tion, which may both distort the choices made by buyers of training and affect the
incentive to employers to sponsor Apprenticeships.
We analyse these issues using data taken from inspections of non-college provi-
ders of Apprenticeships by the Adult Learning Inspectorate (ALI) during 2001-05.
The key evidence concerns trainees’ completion rates: i.e., the rate at which Appren-
tices complete their training programmes. This potentially informative indicator of
the substantive quality of training was largely neglected in inspection practice, de-
spite its prominence in both inspection guidelines and government policy concerns.
Section 2 outlines the analytical framework, followed in section 3 by a descrip-
tion of the institutional attributes of the English training market. The data used
and evidence of the priority of procedural over substantive attributes in inspection
verdicts are presented in section 4. Section 5 analyses statistical differences in in-
spection findings and completion rates by type of provider, occupation, and skill
level, followed in section 6 by qualitative evidence of biased relative evaluation of
employer-sponsored programmes. The conclusions follow in section 7.
2. Analytical framework
Our starting point is the determination of training quality under market-like contract-
ing and the external inspection of training providers. A previous paper compares
economic and political analyses of the issue (Lewis and Ryan, 2009).1
The economic analysis assumes asymmetric information about training quality
between buyers and sellers, and fixed-price contracting. It concludes that training
quality will be inefficiently low, but that external inspection may offset that failure
by improving buyer’s information about quality, thereby increasing reputation-based
incentives to providers to offer acceptable service quality.2 The analysis is potentially
1See also Lewis (2009) and Ryan (2009).
2See Chalkey and Malcomson (2000) and MacLeod (2007). Similarly, in the commitment model of
Dustmann and Schönberg (2008), inspection may make it possible for employers to commit credibly to
provide high quality training.
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relevant to the UK training market, with its contractual relationships, fixed-price
contracts, and extensive inspection system.
The political science approach leads to less optimistic conclusions. The quality
of public training programmes is seen as suffering from conflict between constraints
on government spending and political pressure to make the service widely available:
within a given budget, higher participation means less expenditure per person, and
thereby lower quality. Politicians improve their electoral prospects by giving quan-
tity priority over quality, given the greater political visibility of quantity over quality.
Inspection focuses on what is readily visible: procedure rather than content. Its prin-
cipal function is public reassurance, by way of the papering over of cracks, rather
than the provision of valid evidence on quality. Inspection obfuscates rather than
informs.3
In a recent analysis of inspection reports on providers of Apprenticeship train-
ing in England, we found a systematic neglect of a particular substantive attribute
of training quality: ’learners’ achievements’, i.e., the rate at which trainees stay in
training and complete their programmes. Inspection teams did not process the infor-
mation on trainee retention and completion that was, or at least should have been,
given to them by the provider. The inspectors’ overall verdicts on providers depended
heavily on procedural attributes and only marginally on substantive ones, including
trainee retention and completion rates, and the quality of learning sessions. As such,
inspection practice proved consistent more with the political than with the economic
interpretation (Lewis and Ryan, 2009).
Taking those findings as background, we examine here the implication of ’proce-
duralist bias’ for public assessments of the various types of provider that operate in
the English training market. Inspection results may well distort evaluations of differ-
ent types of training provider, in particular those of employers relative to specialist
training organisations.
The effect of inspection on the perceived relative performance of employers’
programmes may in principle be positive or negative. A negative effect might be
hypothesised on the basis of financial attributes. The funds available to specialist
training organisations are typically limited to their public training grant. Such or-
ganisations stand to make losses if they spend more than their public training grants.
By contrast, employers’ outlays on their Apprentices need not be restricted to the
public subsidy. As a prospective future beneficiary of the resulting skills, the em-
ployer has an incentive to invest more than the public grant in each trainee, which
should increase substantive quality by leading to more learning per trainee. Instances
of expenditures greater than public training grants include large metalworking em-
ployers, many of whom invest in their Apprentices more than three times the public
subsidy.4
Such differences in dependence on public contracts may lead to differences in
compliance with the procedural requirements of public programmes. Commercial
3See Pierson (1996), Power (1999) and Lewis and Ryan (2009: section 2.2).
4Hogarth and Hasluck (2003), Ryan, Gospel and Lewis, (2007).
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training specialists, having typically no alternative revenue source, face a particu-
larly strong incentive to comply with the procedural requirements imposed by the
public buyer and monitored by external inspection. Employers, to the extent that
they depend for their revenues more on product markets than on public training
programmes, enjoy greater scope to neglect externally imposed procedural require-
ments.
The prediction of a bias against employer programmes in inspection findings has
potential exceptions. Some employers are financially insecure and poorly placed to
invest additionally in Apprentices’ skills. The category includes smaller firms, and
local authorities subject to tight fiscal controls by central government. Conversely,
some charities possess independent endowments that allow them to devote core fund-
ing to their training activities rather than relying entirely on contractual income, and
thus to spend more than the public training grant on each trainee.
The alternative hypothesis might well be a positive effect of proceduralist bias
on the assessed performance of employers. The reasons for an employer to provide
work-based training under public subsidy include not only investment in its future
skills supply, but also the acquisition of a current labour supply - even, in the ex-
treme, the use of trainees as cheap labour. Surveys of employers’ costs for apprentice
training have established the dominance of the latter (’production’) motive over the
former (’investment’) one in particular firms and sectors in economies as different as
Germany, Switzerland and the UK.5
Employers with a ’production’ motive for taking on Apprentices may offer lower
quality training than that provided by specialist training organisations. The Appren-
ticeships programme provides exceptional scope for such a pathology, given the
weakness of the external regulation of training content, the dominance of internal
assessment of work-based learning, and the paucity of off-the-job training, let alone
educational content, in training requirements in service occupations.6 Any bias in
inspection towards procedural attributes would then be expected to weaken the evi-
dence of low substantive quality in such programmes.
The potential over-rating by inspection of the training provided by employers
who take a ’production’ approach is however likely to be offset by an institutional
feature of the UK training market: such employers are more likely to participate as
subcontractors for the work-based training component than as principal contractors
for an Apprenticeship programme as a whole. The training programmes in which
such employers are involved are then sponsored by the specialist training organisa-
tion that holds the principal contract, and any tendency to low quality can be ex-
pected to show up in that category rather than in the ’private employer’ one. The
5von Bardeleben, Beicht and Féher (1995), Schweri et al. (2003), Hogarth and Hasluck (2003). A
similar distinction, between expansive and restrictive approaches by employers to Apprenticeships, has
been proposed by Fuller and Unwin (2008). The relative quality of employer programmes may also be
low as a result of the incentive to the employer to orient training content to its own skill requirements - i.e.,
toward specific rather than transferable skills - which reduces training quality, from the social standpoint
at least (Stevens, 1996; Smits, 2005).
6Ryan (2000), Ryan, Gospel and Lewis (2006).
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latter category would then be restricted largely to companies adopting an ’invest-
ment’ approach to training.7
Given this institutional attribute, we hypothesise that (i) Apprenticeships spon-
sored by an employer are of substantively higher quality on average than those by
other providers, and (ii) proceduralist bias leads external inspection to under-estimate
the quality of such employers’ programmes relative to those of specialist training
providers. ’Production’-oriented employers are expected to be concentrated invisi-
bly in the latter category. At the same time, the heterogeneity of employer motivation
and participation means that the situation may differ by sector, occupation, and firm
size.
3. Institutional context
Publicly funded work-based training for young people in England has been organised
in this decade through what is now the Apprenticeships programme. Its two streams
were until 2004 called Foundation Modern Apprenticeship, comprising occupation-
ally-oriented programmes pitched at Level 2 in the vocational dimension of the Na-
tional Qualifications framework, and Advanced Modern Apprenticeship, comprising
Level 3 programmes. The programme has since 2002 contained three components:
’competence’, or practical skills, as certified by a National Vocational Qualification
(NVQ); applied literacy and numeracy, as assessed by Key Skills certification; and
’underpinning knowledge’, as represented by a Technical Certificate. The eleven Ar-
eas of Learning (i.e., occupation-cum-sector categories) into which Apprenticeships
are classified include both those with a history of apprentice training, notably en-
gineering and construction, and those previously devoid of apprenticeship, notably
retailing and business administration.
The Apprenticeships programme is administered by the Learning and Skills
Council (LSC), a non-departmental public body. The LSC provides grants, which
in 2004 varied between £1,000 and £15,000 per Apprentice, as to age and Area and
Level of Learning, for work-based learning by young people (LSC, 2003a).
The Apprenticeships programme shows a complex pattern of provision, which
diverges substantially from both British tradition and contemporary foreign practice.
While every Apprentice’s programme is - or, rather, was initially - required to involve
work-based training with an employer, and while the LSC encourages employers to
give their Apprentices employee status, the employer’s contribution varies greatly
in practice. At one pole, the employer acts as prime contractor - here ’sponsor’ -
and provides most or all of the training itself. At the other extreme, the employer
acts only as the sub-contracting provider of on-the-job training and work experience
7The situation is complicated further by the widespread, and probably increasing, tendency of large
employers with reputable training programmes to contract out formal responsibility for Apprenticeship to
a training company or further education college, in order to avoid the administrative burdens of dealing
with the public funding body (Ryan, Gospel and Lewis, 2006). A contemporary example is BT’s contract
with Accenture to organise its sizeable Apprenticeship programme.
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for Apprentices sponsored by an external provider. Other employers play an inter-
mediate role, providing much of the training themselves, but leaving it to a training
specialist to hold the main contract with the LSC, and typically to assess learners’
achievements itself. This heterogeneity makes it particularly difficult to assess the
extent of employer participation in Apprenticeship training.
Similar complexity characterises the role of further education colleges, who tra-
ditionally provided apprentices with their part-time technical education under day
(or block) release. The role of colleges has both shrunk and expanded relative to
traditional apprenticeship. It has shrunk, in that many Apprenticeship programmes,
particularly in the service sector, involve little or no off-the-job learning, let alone for-
mal technical education. Those that do contain off-the-job learning may not involve
a further education college, but rather a training company or self-provision by the
relevant employer.8 It has expanded, in that many colleges are prime contractors for
Apprenticeships, subcontracting with employers for work-experience and on-the-job
training.9 Some colleges, under ’programme-led Apprenticeships’, which lack any
workplace-based component, have since 2004 even provided entire Apprenticeship
programmes themselves.10
The recasting of the roles of employers and colleges in British apprenticeship
has been complemented by the rapid expansion of specialist training providers, both
for-profit and non-profit. In addition to sponsoring their own Apprenticeship pro-
grammes, such organisations frequently assess for other sponsors their Apprentices’
attainments in work-based competence and Key Skills.
The shares of five categories of training provider among non-college principal
contractors for LSC-funded work-based learning programmes are shown in columns
one and two of Table 1.11 Specialist training companies are the largest group, ac-
counting for nearly one half of both providers and trainees. If non-profit training
organisations are included, the specialist share rises to 61.1 per cent of providers
and 64.7 per cent of trainees. Employers training their own employees constitute
only 28.5 per cent of providers and 17.2 per cent of trainees. Around half of those
employers are public bodies, mostly local authorities and hospitals. Private sector
employers account for only 14.4 per cent of providers and 4.3 per cent of trainees.
However, the private employer share rises to 24.8 per cent of providers and 22.7 per
cent of trainees if employer groups, a diverse category composed overwhelmingly of
private sector employers, are included.
8Ullman and Deakin (2005), Ryan, Gospel and Lewis (2006).
9Statistics on college provision of Apprenticeships are scanty. A review of Modern Apprenticeship
reported that some 186 general further education colleges were involved in recruiting employers, not
just young people, into work-based learning programmes, including Modern Apprenticeship (DfES/LSC,
2004: 13). Similarly, a detailed analysis for a major industrial region reported that 38 out of 188 providers
of work-based learning were further education colleges (LSC, 2003b: 25).
1014.4 per cent of Apprentices took the ’FE programme led pathway’ in 2004-5 (DfES, 2007).
11The classification of providers by category is taken from ALI’s database. The population of inspected
providers during a four year period differs from the population of all providers at a point in time, despite
mandatory inspection, insofar as during the period some providers entered the market too late to be in-
spected and others left it before being inspected.
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Table 1: Shares of training providers and Apprentices by provider category, 2001-05
(%)
All providers Retained providers
Share of Share of Share of Share of
training Apprentices: training Apprentices:
providers five Areas providers five Areas
only only
Employer: private 14.4 4.3 9.7 4.0
Employer: public 14.1 15.2 17.4 15.4
Employer group 10.4 26.1 17.2 31.7
Trainer: for-profit 47.1 41.9 44.1 34.5
Trainer: non-profit 14.0 12.5 11.5 14.3
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 943 165,277 442 100,452
Notes:
Shares of providers and trainees at the time of inspection for (i) all 943 providers in the ALI inspections
database, including those for which an inspection report could not be located on the ALI website, and (ii)
442 retained providers, i.e., those with Apprentices in at least one Area of Learning and an inspection
report providing usable data on trainee outcomes.
’Five Areas only’: Apprentices in the five selected Areas of Learning, excluding trainees in other
LSC-funded programmes, such as ’NVQ only’ training.
Definitions:
1. Employer, private: for-profit companies training their own employees.
2. Employer, public: local authorities, health authorities, educational institutions, armed forces, and
other.
3. Employer group: group training associations, employers’ associations, Chambers of Commerce, and
Industry Training Boards.
4. Trainer, for-profit: companies who provide training and related services for individuals who are not
their own employees.
5. Trainer, non-profit: non-profit organisations, including charities and companies limited by guarantee,
who provide training and related services for individuals who are not their own employees.
Inspection has been the responsibility of the Adult Learning Inspectorate (ALI),
a non-departmental government body set up in 2001 to inspect on a four yearly cycle
all non-college organisations holding an LSC contract for the supply of work-based
training. It was to inform the government about ’the quality of education and train-
ing’ and to ’help bring about improvement by identifying strengths and weaknesses
and highlighting good and poor practice’ (ALI, 2002a: 4).
At the end of an on-site visit to a training provider, and guided by the Common
Inspection Framework, inspection teams awarded grades for five aspects of overall
provision: Leadership & Management; Quality Assurance; Equality of Opportunity;
Areas of Learning (Occupation/Curriculum); and Learning Sessions. Most reports
also included data on trainee flows and outcomes, i.e., numbers entering, staying in
(’retained’), and completing training, by Area and Level of Learning and by year
of entry - though no report suggested that those data had been used to calculate
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retention and completion rates. Many reports also provided qualitative evidence of
other attributes, such as the presence of a specialist training facility and training
beyond the requirements of the relevant Apprenticeship framework. The inspectors
summarised their findings by classing the provider’s training as either ’adequate’ or
’not adequate’. The inspection report was subsequently published on ALI’s website.
Providers rated inadequate were subject to re-inspection within two years.12
4. Data and prior results
Our data are taken from the 943 inspection reports published by ALI between its in-
ception in March 2001 and July 2005 that could be accessed on its website in August
2005 for principal contractors to the Apprenticeships programme13 in one or more
of five Areas of Learning: construction, engineering, business administration, infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT), and retailing. The five Areas were
selected so as to include the great majority of Apprentices and a range of occupations
and sectors.14
Further education colleges could not be included as the inspection of their pro-
grammes was organised differently, with a limited reporting format.15
We retain the 442 reports that provide usable information not only on quality-
related attributes for the provider as a whole but also on trainee flows into and out
of training in at least one Area-Level category (e.g., construction Level 2). From the
latter data we calculate Apprentice retention and completion rates. Trainee outcomes
are measured for an average of 1.9 cohorts per provider. The median first year of
Apprentice entry is 1998-99. The data cover almost 100,000 entering Apprentices,
58 per cent of whom trained for retailing or business administration. Slightly more
trainees entered Level 3 than Level 2 programmes.16
Discarding more than half of the inspection reports reduces the shares of both
private employers and training companies, and increases the share of both public
employers and employer groups (Table 1, columns 1 and 3, 2 and 4). These changes
indicate that data on trainee flows and outcomes are less frequently compiled for (or
used by) inspection teams in the case of private employers and training companies
than of public employers and employer groups. They also raise the possibility of
sample selection bias. Thus, if providers who do not compile data on trainee out-
comes tend to offer poorer training, our sample will be biased toward better quality
12ALI was merged into the schools inspectorate (OfSTED) in 2007. A more detailed account of external
inspection is provided by Lewis and Ryan (2009). See also Perry and Sherlock (2008).
13We use the programme’s current title, ‘Apprenticeships’, instead of the previous title, ‘Modern Ap-
prenticeship’. We capitalise the term to indicate that we refer to a government programme that overlaps,
but is not coterminous, with ‘apprenticeship’ as that term has been understood in other times and places.
14Apprentices in the five selected Areas of Learning accounted at the time of inspection for 87 per cent
of (196,945) Apprentices across all twelve Areas (in the population of 943 providers).
15Five providers (in the population of 943 inspected ones) use the name of a public college, typically as
a separate organisation set up by the college to contract with the LSC (e.g., Northallerton College Training
Services).
16See Lewis and Ryan (2009), Table 1.
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provision. Any such bias need not however affect our comparison of performance
across different types of provider.
The Apprenticeship programme is known to be highly heterogeneous, with
marked differences between long established and recently established Areas of Learn-
ing. Method of provision varies considerably across Areas of Learning (Table 2,
covering all work-based learning). All types of provider are present in all Areas of
Learning, but the contribution of particular categories differs by Area. The share of
private employers is negligible in business administration and retailing. In construc-
tion, most of the training is sponsored by employer groups; in retailing and business
administration, by training companies. Public sector employers are the largest cate-
gory in IT.
Table 2: Shares of provider categories in training volume by Area of Learning (%)
Const- Engin- Bus ICT Retail- All five
ruction eering Admin ing
Employer: private 1.9 6.4 0.4 6.3 1.8 3.2
Employer: public 6.2 23.5 13.7 42.8 3.3 14.0
Employer group 50.8 39.9 13.1 5.6 10.3 29.6
Trainer: for-profit 9.8 22.4 59.4 37.5 74.2 38.3
Trainer: non-profit 31.3 7.8 13.3 7.8 10.4 14.8
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 29032 41577 24171 4813 27469 127062
Note: trainees (Apprentices and others) at the time of inspection; 442 retained providers.
The median inspection verdict across all 442 providers is ’adequate’; the median
grade for detailed attributes is ’satisfactory’ for all except Quality Assurance. Median
retention and completion rates are however low, at 50 and 38 per cent respectively.
Trainee outcomes are also highly dispersed: the completion rate at the lower quartile
is only 11 per cent, as against 61 per cent at the upper quartile.
Evidence pointing to proceduralist bias in inspection findings, as provided by
Lewis and Ryan (2009: Tables 4, 5), comprises firstly higher correlations between
the overall verdict on a provider (Adequacy) and grades given for such procedu-
rally oriented attributes of provision as Leadership & Management than between the
same verdict and substantive attributes such as Learning Sessions and, in particu-
lar, retention and completion rates. The pattern was confirmed by a multivariate
probit analysis of inspection verdicts. Secondly, correlations between the procedu-
ral and substantive attributes, while all significantly positive, are much smaller than
those within each group of attributes. Thirdly, the re-inspection of providers who
failed their initial inspection focuses entirely on procedural criteria. This evidence
suggests that, while both procedural and substantive attributes influence inspection
verdicts, the dominant influence comes from the procedural side.17
17A further substantive weakness of the inspection system is neglect of the low incidence of qualifica-
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5. Statistical results
The bias toward procedural attributes in ALI’s inspections, which reduces their in-
formational content as a whole, may also distort assessments of the relative quality
offered by the various types of provider.
Table 3 breaks down inspection results by type of provider. Taking all five Areas
of Learning together, median grades for the five qualitative criteria differ little across
provider types. The median member of most or all categories of provider is graded
’satisfactory’ for Leadership and Management, Equality of Opportunity, Areas of
Learning (O/C), and Learning Sessions; and ’unsatisfactory’ for Quality Assurance.
What differences there are across provider types largely favour employers in gen-
eral, and private sector employers in particular. The median overall verdict in the
three employer categories is ’adequate’, whereas that for both categories of special-
ist training provider is ’inadequate’. Employers, both private and public, are the only
providers to earn a median grade of ’satisfactory’ for Quality Assurance; and private
employers, to be rated ’good’ for Areas of Learning. By contrast, the median grades
given to specialist training organisations are ’unsatisfactory’ for both Leadership and
Quality Assurance, in the case of for-profit providers, and for Quality Assurance in
the case of non-profit providers as well.
The hypothesis that the median grade is the same in all provider categories is
statistically rejected for all five attributes. The principal cause is the superior per-
formance of private sector employers: when the hypothesis is applied to the median
grade across the other four provider categories, i.e., excluding private sector employ-
ers, it is not rejected, either for Adequacy or for four of the five detailed attributes.
The differences between employers and other providers in Table 3 are more strik-
ing when it comes to trainee outcomes, which we interpret as a valid indicator of
substantive training quality.18 Private employers’ median retention and completion
rates, at 83 and 77 per cent, respectively, are an order of magnitude larger than those
of other providers, which lie around 50 per cent and less than 40 per cent respectively.
Public employers also do better than non-employer providers, but by a smaller mar-
gin. Training companies bring up the rear, with retention rates of less than one-half
(46 per cent), and completion rates of only one-third (33 per cent). At first glance,
therefore, the evidence suggests that external inspection favours employers. Indeed,
private sector employers come out on top on almost all criteria. Among the other
four categories of provider, neither public sector employers nor employer groups
tions, both occupational and pedagogical, among training staff (Rose and Wiganek, 1990). Our findings
contradict the view, reportedly common among training providers, that ’... providers were usually only
given ... high inspection grades if a large proportion of their learners met all the requirements of their
modern apprenticeship framework. Some felt that a disproportionate weight was given to the rate for suc-
cessful completion of modern apprenticeships and that other factors should be taken into consideration as
evidence of quality and good performance’ (LSC, 2003b: 24).
18Causality may run both ways between training quality and trainee outcomes: e.g., better programmes
induce more trainees to complete, and providers who want more trainees to complete offer better pro-
grammes.
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stand out strongly either way.
That does not however settle the issue. The large difference in retention and com-
pletion rates between private employers and other providers is not mirrored in com-
parably large differences between private employers and other providers, whether in
grades for Areas of Learning (O/C), which, according to ALI’s procedural mandate,
should reflect trainee progress, nor, crucially, in Adequacy as a whole.
That pattern is consistent with the much greater influence on inspection outcomes
of procedural criteria, notably Leadership & Management, than of substantive ones
(Learning Sessions and trainee outcomes). In other words, while private sector em-
ployers do fare better than other providers in inspection results, the difference in
their favour would be even greater were more weight given to retention and comple-
tion rates, the area in which their performance outstrips considerably that of other
providers. In that sense, the inspection system under-rates the performance of em-
ployers in general, and that of private sector employers in particular.
The inference must however be qualified on three grounds, the empirical signif-
icance of which will be explored further below. First, grades for Adequacy, Leader-
ship, etc., are ordinal variables, and any specific difference in them across providers
is logically consistent with both larger and smaller absolute differences in the cardi-
nal variables - trainee outcomes - that are supposed to help determine them.
Second, in our data only 43 principal contractors are private sector employers.
Moreover, as Table 4 shows, most of the private sector employers who sponsor Ap-
prenticeship do so in engineering. Indeed, more than half (52.5 per cent) of private
sector employers’ entering Apprentices go into Level 3 engineering programmes.
The experience of these employers may therefore provide a less than fully valid and
reliable guide to what would prevail were more employers involved in the Appren-
ticeship programme, particularly in other Areas and Levels of Learning. Indeed,
what appears in Table 3 to be a private employer effect on completion rates may
simply be an Area or Level effect: e.g., high completion rates in Level 3 training in
engineering as a whole.
Third, while higher retention and completion rates might provide valid evidence
of better training within a provider category, the superior performance of private
sector employers on those criteria might be expected to result from more factors than
simply training quality. Both the context of training and the manner of selection into
it may influence retention and completion rates. In terms of context, training may be
expected to lead more directly to employment in general, and to a permanent contract
in particular, when it is sponsored by an employer than by a specialist trainer. Young
people may then have more incentive to complete a programme of given quality
when it is sponsored by the former rather than the latter. Indeed, if their training
is organised by a specialist provider, they have a particular incentive to drop out of
training if offered a job before the end of their programme.
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Table 4: Private sector employers: numbers and shares of Apprentices by Area
Number Share (%) of
Area of Learning Providersa Traineesb Providersa Traineesb
Construction 2 561 2.5 1.9
Engineering 31 2657 15.3 6.4
Business Administration 5 95 1.7 0.4
ICT 3 301 3.5 6.3
Retailing 6 493 2.8 1.8
Any (of five) 43 4107 9.7 3.2
Notes: n=442 (retained providers only)
aprivate sector employers with trainees in any LSC-funded programmes in the Area
bnumber of trainees in the Area at inspection as a share of all trainees in all providers in the Area
In terms of selection, employers should be able to choose better trainees, who
are more likely to complete training, independently of its quality. Employers of-
fering Apprenticeships commonly accept only applicants with specific levels of at-
tainment in compulsory schooling, e.g., five GCSE subjects at grade C+, including
English and maths. By contrast, many specialist providers accept anyone eligible for
public funding, and some, particularly non-profit organisations, actively cater to low
achievers (Ryan, Gospel and Lewis, 2006).
This interpretation of the link between completion rates and training quality does
not however explain the superiority of trainee outcomes for private sector employers
over those for public sector employers and employer groups - both of which should
be similar to solo companies when it comes to offering employment after training,
and possibly also to recruiting able young people. Moreover, other research finds that
completion rates for employers as a whole are reduced by employer choices, whether
to ensure that the young person remains an employee or because the employer does
not value the uncompleted parts of the training programme (Winterbotham et al.,
2000). Indeed, the great majority of Apprentices - and not just those sponsored by
a private employer - spend part or all of their time in work-based training and work
experience, and as such constitute potential recruits for the employer that provides
their work-based training before they have completed their programmes.
An assessment of the validity of the latter two potential explanations of the higher
completion rates of private employers requires statistical controls for other potential
determinants of completion rates, including trainee ability, size of training operation,
and training occupation. That is to some extent possible, using other data taken from
inspection reports. Private employers’ programmes are on average smaller, more
frequently ’country-wide’ in coverage, and much more frequently limited to a single
Area of Learning (Table 5). To the extent that completion rates vary with those
factors, the robustness of the employer effect on completion can be examined by
including them in a regression analysis of completion rates.19
19Other research on work-based learning programmes has found provider specialisation to be positively
associated with performance (LSC, 2003b).
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Table 5: Characteristics of Apprenticeship programmes by category of provider
Average number Share of Share of
of traineesa providers that providers with a
are country- single Area of
wideb (%) Learningc (%)
Employer: private sector 100.2 28.9 90.7
Employer: public sector 241.6 1.3 24.7
Employer group 489.4 7.8 36.8
Trainer: for-profit 240.8 11.1 22.1
Trainer: non-profit 350.2 24.1 15.7
All 283.3 12.2 24.7
Notes: n=442
anumber of trainees in the five Areas (all programmes, including Apprentices) at the time of inspection
bproviders of any LSC-funded work-based learning in more than two regions
ctrainees (including Apprentices) in only one of 11 Areas of Learning
We therefore start with statistical controls for size of provider (number of trainees)
and country-wide status. The effect of private employer sponsorship on completion
rates remains strongly positive: the estimated differential relative to training compa-
nies is 33 percentage points (Table 6, column 1).20 The differential between public
employers and training companies is much smaller, at 7.5 points, but it too is positive
and statistically significant. Employer groups and non-profit training specialists are
however statistically indistinguishable from training companies. Programme size has
a mixed effect: positive in the selected five Areas, but negative for all eleven Areas.
When controls are also introduced for the particular Areas of Learning in which a
provider operates, the best estimate of the private employer effect falls moderately, to
27.5 points, and that for public employers becomes statistically insignificant (Table
6, column 2). The only Area in which completion rates differ systematically from
the five Area norm is retailing, in which the estimated rate is nearly 10 points lower.
Programme size effects become insignificant.
The private employer effect falls more strongly when further controls are im-
posed for the extent of providers’ specialisation by Area of Learning. Providers who
train in one Area only are estimated to have an average completion rate 11.5 points
above the norm; and those who train in engineering AMA (Level 3) only, a fur-
ther 16 point difference. The private employer effect is halved by these adjustments.
In other words, part of the simple association between private employer status and
trainee completion does indeed reflect the tendency of the private employers engaged
in Apprenticeships to specialise in a single Area of Learning, particularly in Level
20We use for simplicity a linear probability rather than a logistic specification, given the paucity of
observations close to the boundaries (0 and 100 per cent). The results of a similar analysis of retention
rates are not reported, as the results were similar to those for completion but statistically less well defined,
given the smaller sample size.
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3 engineering, and not to operate in retailing - but not the smaller size of their pro-
grammes, nor their tendency to operate on a wider territorial basis.21 However, at
14.9 points, the net employer effect on completion rates remains economically large
and statistically significant.
These results cannot however be taken to have isolated the ’pure’ private em-
ployer effect, given potentially powerful selection effects among both trainees and
employers. As argued in section 2, in terms of trainee selection, the effects of trainee
quality on completion rates are potentially strong; in terms of employer selection,
employers who act as principal contractors for Apprenticeships are expected more
commonly to adopt an ’investment’ than a ’production’ approach to Apprentice train-
ing. Data with which to control for these selection effects are not however avail-
able.22
Subject to that reservation, the evidence suggests firstly that inspection under-
rates the training programmes of employers, because of the marginal status it assigns
to completion rates in assessing providers’ performance. Secondly, the superiority
of employers’ programmes is overwhelmingly a matter of the superiority of private
sector employers who sponsor their own training programmes. The performance
of public employers and employer groups lies closer to that of specialist training
organisations that to that of private sector employers.
Proceduralist bias in external inspection might be expected also to cause em-
ployers, particularly private sector ones, to crop up with disproportionate frequency
among providers rated ’inadequate’ despite having a high completion rate, in asso-
ciation with low grades for Leadership & Management.23 If a high completion rate
is defined as one in the upper quartile of the distribution - here, at least 61 per cent
- twenty-two providers satisfy that criterion but still fail the inspection. Eleven are
employers, a share that is significantly larger than the share of employers among
providers as a whole (χ2 = 5.14; p < 0.05, one tail test). Although eight of those
eleven are public bodies, the three private sector ones are among the eight providers
with the highest completion rates in the category (Table 7, panel I).
21Standard errors on the key coefficients in Table 6 do not increase substantially when the additional
control variables are introduced, which suggests that multicollinearity is limited. The number of private
employers outside Level 3 engineering may be small, but the number of non-employer providers is sub-
stantial even in Level 3 engineering, which ensures the statistical separability of the effects of private
employer and sector-Level status.
22An analysis of selection effects among employers would require data on employers who do not partic-
ipate in Apprenticeships, or do so only indirectly, from which a participation equation could be estimated
and the results used in an attempt to control for selection into principal contractor status.
23Similarly, an OfSTED inspection failed a school for serious weaknesses in management systems
despite having 88% of lessons rated at least satisfactory (Weiner, 2002).
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Table 6: Regression analysis of Apprentices’ completion rate
(1) (2) (3)
Private employer 33.3* 27.5* 14.9*
(4.1) (4.2) (4.8)
Public employer 7.5* 4.9 5.5
(3.1) (3.2) (3.1)
Employer group 2.5 1.3 0.9
(3.1) (3.5) (3.3)
Trainer: non-profit 1.3 0.6 1.2
(3.7) (3.6) (3.5)
Number of trainees (5 Areas)a 0.81* 0.51 0.38
(0.41) (0.41) (0.40)
Number of trainees (all Areas)a -0.78* -0.44 -0.30
(0.39) (0.39) (0.38)
Country-wide provider -2.0 -2.4 -2.3
(4.2) (4.1) (4.0)
Trains in constructionb -6.4 -6.2
(4.4) (4.2)
Trains in engineeringb -1.5 -1.3
(3.0) (2.9)
Trains in business administrationb -2.9 1.2
(2.5) (2.6)
Trains in ICTb -0.5 0.2
(4.2) (4.2)
Trains in retailingb -9.5* -6.5*
(2.7) (2.7)
Trains in one Area only 11.4*
(2.9)
Trains in engineering Level 3 only 16.0*
(5.1)
Year 2002 1.6 3.5 3.2
(3.2) (3.2) (3.1)
Year 2003 2.8 3.5 3.6
(3.4) (3.4) (3.3)
Year 2004 8.4* 7.2 7.8*
(4.0) (3.9) (3.8)
Year 2005 8.2 9.1 8.1
(6.8) (6.6) (6.5)
Intercept 34.5* 40.1* 33.1*
(2.9) (3.1) (3.4)
R2(adjusted) 0.19 0.20 0.25
Notes: n=441; Ordinary Least Squares; ’trainer: for profit’ is the omitted provider category;
’country-wide provider’ and ’trains in particular Area’ (i.e., any trainees present at inspection) and ’year’
are dummy variables (1: yes); * indicates significant difference from zero (p=0.05)
aHundreds of trainees (all programmes, including Apprenticeships)
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Similarly, non-employer providers with low completion rates might be expected
to gain an ’adequate’ rating as long as they achieved passing grades for procedural
attributes. The category is well populated. Defining a low completion rate as one in
the lower quartile - here, less than 21 per cent - thirty-eight organisations with low
completion rates are rated ’adequate’, in association with grades of at least ’satisfac-
tory’ for Leadership & Management. The set comprises twenty training companies,
five non-profit training specialists, six employer groups, and seven employers. The
share of employers (public and private) is significantly lower than among providers
as a whole (χ2 = 4.78; p < 0.05). The asymmetry is even greater for private sec-
tor employers, with only one (BP Retail, with a completion rate of 18.8 per cent)
present. The eight cases with the lowest completion rates, all no greater than six per
cent, are listed in panel (II) of Table 7.
This pattern might not however be caused by proceduralist bias against employ-
ers’ programmes. Providers rated ’inadequate’ despite having a high completion
rate may perform badly in respect of other substantive attributes, including Learning
Sessions and Areas of Learning (O/C). However, only two of the eight providers in
panel (I) of Table 7 - and none of the three private sector employers - were failed on
one of those two criteria. Similarly, providers rated ’adequate’ despite a low com-
pletion rate might be pulled up by other substantive attributes. This interpretation
appears more plausible: none of the eight providers in panel (II) was failed for either
Learning Sessions or Areas of Learning (O/C). Even so, the low importance that the
inspectors implicitly attached in all those cases to completion rates no greater than
six per cent represents a disturbing feature of such inspection ’successes’.
6. Qualitative findings
Further evidence can also be derived from the text of inspection reports. We consider
two aspects: first, in the more striking cases of employer failure, evidence of the
trumping by procedural attributes of qualitative evidence of high training quality,
concerning training staff and facilities in particular; second, a tension between tone
and content in reports on employers who do pass muster. The specific examples cited
here do not represent training practices or inspection outcomes in the round, but they
augment the statistical evidence in the previous section.
On the former count, the relevant private sector employers are Honeywell, Swin-
don Pressings, and United Utilities (Table 7). All offered traditional engineering
apprenticeships, all had completion rates exceeding 80 per cent, and all were rated
’satisfactory’ for Areas of Learning (O/C). The text of all three reports contains evi-
dence of a large investment by the employer in dedicated training facilities and staff.
Nevertheless, all three were failed for procedural deficiencies.
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The report for United Utilities acknowledges the presence of an expensive and
ambitious traditional engineering apprenticeship (’the company invests heavily in its
modern apprenticeship scheme’ . . . the company’s off-the-job training centre is ’well
resourced’, with ’extensive and excellent accommodation’, ’all assessment is based
on real work’: 7, 13, 12). The training is reported to outstrip the requirements of
Apprenticeships. It is nevertheless rated ’inadequate’ because of procedural weak-
nesses that include: unclear lines of managerial authority; reactive and uncritical
self-assessment (’self-assessment reports were produced in 1998 and 2002, just be-
fore inspection’ and ’some strengths were no more than normal practice’: 10); inad-
equate internal verification of NVQ assessments; and delays in updating individual
training plans to reflect trainees’ progress. The criticism that Key Skills training re-
ceives insufficient attention sits strangely beside the fact that all entering apprentices
held good school leaving qualifications (at least five GCSEs; 11, 14), which should
have removed the requirement for additional Key Skills training.24
Similarly, the report for Swindon Pressings Ltd. acknowledges the substan-
tive qualities of traditional engineering apprenticeship, as characterised by: gen-
erous staffing; a company training school; part-time technical education in the lo-
cal college; training curricula that exceed the requirements of Apprenticeships; and
favourable opportunities for apprentices to progress to higher qualifications. Set
against these qualities, the inspectors note a poor coordination of Key Skills training,
’little reinforcement of equal opportunities . . . and [poor] learners’ understanding [of
EO]’, ’incomplete’ arrangements for quality assurance, weak internal verification of
skills assessments, and a weak individualisation of training programmes. The im-
plicit demand for fully individualised training plans (’all learners have the same end
dates’: 6) is not economically realistic, given the high cost of fully bespoke learning
programmes; nor is it applied to university-level learning.25
These companies’ relations with further education were subject to specific crit-
icism, primarily for the absence of a formal contractual relationship, a weak inte-
gration of on-the-job and college-based learning, and deficient monitoring of the
college’s contribution. Inspection has visibly set its face against the informal trust-
oriented organisation of traditional apprenticeship, including employers’ relations
with further education colleges - to the extent that they failed three programmes
whose substantive quality was manifestly high.
At the other end of the spectrum, the inspectors of three of the eight providers
with the lowest completion rates in Table 7, Touchstone Group, South Staffordshire
Training, and First Rung, emphasise favourable procedural attributes, in terms of
organisational strategy, the codification of management procedures, and the presence
of operating manuals. Learners’ attainments are in all cases described as low, but the
24http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/oxedu reports/download/(id)/78913/(as)/55164 304831.pdf (2002 report,
accessed 25 November 2008). The inspectors appear not to have observed any learning sessions.
25http://docs.ali.gov.uk/Inspreps/13/3388DET.PDF (report dated 18 November 2002), accessed 1 May
2007. Neither this nor the Honeywell (Normalair-Garrett) Ltd., report of 11 June 2002 could be traced on
the OfSTED website in November 2008.
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reports do not bring out just how low they are, nor do they discuss the implications of
that fact. Ironically, the first two providers are criticised for the inadequacy of their
information about their trainees’ outcomes - an essentially procedural failing that
is not allowed to tarnish the inspectors’ overall assessment, despite the procedural
orientation of the reports.26
The second type of qualitative evidence suggestive of procedural bias against
employer programmes concerns the terminology of inspection reports, as explored,
e.g., in Sinkinson (2004) for school inspections. We focus here on employers who,
despite being rated ’adequate’ overall, have their training programmes described in
less than favourable terms, despite evidence of a substantively high quality.
A prominent example is Rolls-Royce (Derby), whose engineering apprentice-
ship programme showed high rates of retention and completion. Its 2006 inspection
report rates both the ’overall effectiveness of provision’ and ’Leadership and Man-
agement’ as only ’satisfactory’; it criticises the company’s self-assessment report as
’insufficiently rigorous’; and it even asserts that ’the provider has not demonstrated
that it has sufficient capacity to make improvements’. Retention and completion,
which we calculate at 79 and 81 per cent, are termed only ’good’, even though in
our data that would place them more than one standard deviation above the mean for
engineering and more than two deviations above that for the five Areas of Learning
as a whole.27
A more extensive investigation would be required to determine the prevalence of
this particular pathology. Even were it only a matter of a grudging tone in reports
on providers rated ’adequate’, the result could still be an unwarranted impairment
of an employer’s reputation for training. Employers who nevertheless receive a pass
may simply shrug off the inspectors’ lack of enthusiasm, knowing that politicians
and programme managers need them more than they need the Apprenticeships pro-
gramme.
Failing an inspection altogether might however be expected to have stronger
effects, including leading an employer to withdraw from the Apprenticeship pro-
gramme. No re-inspection report exists for four of the eight private employers in
our dataset who failed inspection, including United Utilities. As re-inspection was
mandatory for providers who continued in LSC-funded training, these four employ-
26http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/oxedu reports/download/(id)/79094/(as)/57318 305012.pdf and http://
www.ofsted.gov.uk/oxedu reports/download/(id)/78900/(as)/54490 304818.pdf; accessed 30 Novem-
ber 2008. First Rung is a charity that targets young people with ’learning difficulties and dis-
abilities’ from ’diverse social and economic areas’. Of its trainees, ’more than 60 per cent . . .
have additional social or learning needs’, and ’fifty per cent come from minority ethnic groups’.
In that context, low achievement rates convey only limited information about training quality
(http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/oxedu reports/download/(id)/78691/(as)/51850 304609.pdf; accessed 30
November 2008). Reports on the remaining providers in Table 11 Panel II could not be located on
OfSTED’s website in November 2008.
27http://docs.ali.gov.uk/Inspreps/31/7880DET.PDF; report of 17 March 2006, accessed 1 May 2007;
not traceable on the OfSTED website in November 2008. The previous (24 June 2002) report, from
which we calculate retention and completion rates of 87 and 85 per cent respectively, contained similar
criticisms but adopted a more appreciative tone.
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ers may be taken to have left the programme. As two of them had low completion
rates, their exit may have been appropriate. That is however unlikely for the other
two, United Utilities and Lincolnshire Co-operative Society, both of which had above
average completion rates.28
Whether such employers are passed or not, the reputation of the Apprenticeships
programme in employer circles can hardly have benefited from the procedural biases
of the inspection system, to the potential detriment of employer involvement and
commitment.
7. Conclusions
The content of inspection reports on providers of publicly-funded Apprenticeships in
England suggests that inspection emphasises procedural rather than substantive at-
tributes of training quality, and that this proceduralist bias leads to the under-rating of
training programmes that are sponsored by private sector employers, relative to those
of other employers, both public sector and group private sector ones, and specialist
training organisations, both commercial and non-profit. Programmes sponsored by
private employers have much higher completion rates, which we take to be evidence
of higher training quality.
The finding is at one level surprising - for various reasons. Many inspection
reports allude to learners’ achievements. The annual report of ALI’s Chief Inspector
contained for some years lists of the best and the worst training providers, with the
former dominated by private employers and the latter by training companies (e.g.,
ALI, 2002b). Moreover, the grades given by the inspectors for the attributes on which
they concentrated differed little between private employers and other providers, and,
if anything, favoured private employers. Finally, the Chief Inspector declared that
” ... it appears that employers training their own staff have now lost their decisive
advantage in terms of quality over commercial providers” (ALI, 2004: 13).
That judgement appears itself to have involved proceduralist bias, but the flaw
in the inspection system that it overlooked was not immediately obvious. The su-
periority of private employers’ completion rates was obscured by the weak attention
that the inspection system paid to learners’ achievements, notwithstanding the re-
quirements of the Common Inspection Framework. But the flaw is substantial, and
it survives statistical controls for the tendency of employer provision to focus on
single occupation-sector categories with higher completion rates, particularly craft
level Apprenticeships in metalworking. Moreover, the defect involves specifically
private sector employers: public employers and employer groups are statistically
indistinguishable from specialist training bodies.
Our findings are not definitive, as they are subject to selection biases on both
the employer and the trainee sides. Employers are involved in the Apprenticeship
programme in diverse ways, and our findings refer only to the few that take full
28The two ’not re-inspected’ employers with low completion rates (2.9 and 28.9 per cent respectively)
were Jenkins Newell Dunford Group and Topps Tiles.
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responsibility for Apprenticeships, by holding the principal contract for public fund-
ing. Many more employers are involved simply as providers of work-based learning,
subcontracted to specialist trainers. Some of them undoubtedly provide low quality
training, using trainees as cheap labour, and contributing thereby to the unfavourable
performance of the ’training specialist’ categories of provider.
Similarly, selection effects can be anticipated on trainee side, to the extent that
private employers offer the best training and employment prospects, and are able as
a result to select the best trainees, who are intrinsically more likely to complete their
programmes.
A second qualification to our findings is that the proceduralist bias of the inspec-
tion system may have fallen since 2005, the last year covered by our data. Comple-
tion rates have risen steadily over the decade, particularly among specialist training
bodies (Lewis and Ryan, 2009: Figure 1). The revised Common Inspection Frame-
work places trainees’ attainments ahead of organisational attributes in the list of in-
spectors’ priorities (ALI-OfSTED, 2005). The LSC adopted in 2006 an algorithm
for computing a provider’s completion rates; recent inspection reports on providers
of work-based learning both present and process data on learners’ attainments (LSC,
2006). The acid test is however whether such changes amount to more than window-
dressing when it comes to the overall inspection verdict. A similar statistical analy-
sis of more recent data would be required to answer that question. Were the answer
favourable to inspection, the under-rating of the training programmes of private sec-
tor employers to which we have pointed would be expected to have declined.
In any case, the government continues to express its concern to raise completion
rates in, and to increase employer engagement with, the Apprenticeships programme.
Thus a recent policy innovation, which increases public spending in order to ex-
pand the programme, focuses entirely on employers with ’high quality’ programmes
(LSC, 2008).
Our results suggest however that the inspection system to some extent frustrates
the attainment of both goals. A better understanding of the contribution of private
employers might lead the government both to induce more to take full responsibility
for their training programmes, and to point its inspectorate to the benefits of their
doing so - to the potential benefit of both Apprentice attainments and overall training
quality.29
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